From 1968 to 2003 Iraq was ruled by the Baʿath (Arabic: “Renaissance”) Party. Under a provisional constitution adopted by the party in 1970, Iraq was confirmed as a republic, with legislative power theoretically vested in an elected legislature but also in the party-run Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), without whose approval no law could be promulgated. Executive power rested with the president, who also served as the chairman of the RCC, supervised the cabinet ministers, and ostensibly reported to the RCC. Judicial power was also, in theory, vested in an independent judiciary. The political system, however, operated with little reference to constitutional provisions, and from 1979 to 2003 President Saddam Hussein wielded virtually unlimited power.
- 1 Government and society
- 2 Constitutional framework
- 3 Local government
- 4 Justice
- 5 Political process
- 6 Security of Iraq
- 7 Health and welfare
- 8 Housing
- 9 Education of Iraq
- 01 Cultural life
- 11 The arts of Iraq
- 21 Cultural institutions
- 31 Sports and recreation
- 41 Media and publishing
- 51 Reference
Following the overthrow of the Baʿath government in 2003, the United States and its coalition allies established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), headed by a senior American diplomat. In July the CPA appointed the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which assumed limited governing functions. The IGC approved an interim constitution in March 2004, and a permanent constitution was approved by a national plebiscite in October 2005. This document established Iraq as a federal state in which limited authority—over matters such as defense, foreign affairs, and customs regulations—was vested in the national government. A variety of issues (e.g., general planning, education, and health care) are shared competencies, and other issues are treated at the discretion of the district and regional constituencies.
The constitution is in many ways the framework for a fairly typical parliamentary democracy. The president is the head of state, the prime minister is the head of government, and the constitution provides for two deliberative bodies, the Council of Representatives (Majlis al-Nawwāb) and the Council of Union (Majlis al-Ittiḥād). The judiciary is free and independent of the executive and the legislature.
The president, who is nominated by the Council of Representatives and who is limited to two four-year terms, holds what is largely a ceremonial position. The head of state presides over state ceremonies, receives ambassadors, endorses treaties and laws, and awards medals and honours. The president also calls upon the leading party in legislative elections to form a government (the executive), which consists of the prime minister and the cabinet and which, in turn, must seek the approval of the Council of Representatives to assume power. The executive is responsible for setting policy and for the day-to-day running of the government. The executive also may propose legislation to the Council of Representatives.
The Council of Representatives does not have a set number of seats but is based on a formula of one representative for every 100,000 citizens. Ministers serve four-year terms and sit in session for eight months per year. The council’s functions include enacting federal laws, monitoring the performance of the prime minister and the president, ratifying foreign treaties, and approving appointments; in addition, it has the authority to declare war.
The constitution is very brief on the issue of the Council of Union, the structure, duties, and powers of which apparently will be left to later legislation. The constitution only notes that this body will include representatives of the regions and governorates, suggesting that it will likely take the form of an upper house.
Iraq is divided for administrative purposes into 18 muḥāfaẓāt (governorates), 3 of which constitute the autonomous Kurdistan Region. Each governorate has a governor, or muḥāfiẓ, appointed by the president. The governorates are divided into 91 aqḍiyyah (districts), headed by district officers, and each district is divided into nāḥiyāt (tracts), headed by directors. Altogether, there are 141 tracts in Iraq. Towns and cities have their own municipal councils, each of which is directed by a mayor. Baghdad has special status and its own governor. The Kurdish Autonomous Region was formed by government decree in 1974, but in reality it attained autonomy only with the help of coalition forces following the Persian Gulf War. It is governed by an elected 50-member legislative council. The Kurdistan Region was ratified under the 2005 constitution, which also authorizes the establishment of future regions in other parts of Iraq as part of a federal state.
Judicial affairs in Iraq are administered by the Supreme Judicial Council, which nominates the justices of the Supreme Court, the national prosecutor, and other high judicial officials for approval by the Council of Representatives. Members of the Supreme Court are required to be experts in civil law and Muslim canon law and are appointed by two-thirds majority of the legislature. In addition to interpreting the constitution and adjudicating legal issues at the national level, the Supreme Court also settles disputes over legal issues between national government and lower jurisdictions. During the Baʿath era the judiciary was generally bypassed, and the regime instituted a wide variety of exceptional courts whose authority circumvented the constitution. The establishment of such courts is clearly proscribed under the 2005 constitution. All additional courts are to be established by due process of law.
The Baʿath Party was a self-styled socialist and Arab nationalist party once connected with the ruling Baʿath Party in Syria, although the two parties were often at odds. After the Baʿath Party came to power, Iraq became effectively a one-party state, with all governing institutions nominally espousing the Baʿath ideology. In 1973 the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) agreed to join a Baʿath-dominated National Progressive Front, and in 1974 a group of Kurdish political parties, including the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), joined. In 1979, after the ICP had suffered serious disagreements with the Baʿath leadership and a bloody purge, it left the Front, and it was subsequently outlawed by the government. In addition to the ICP, several other opposition parties were outlawed by the Baʿath. The best known among them are the KDP, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and two religious Shiʿi parties: the Daʿwah (“Call”) Islamic Party and the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (known since 2007 as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq). Another group, the Iraqi National Congress, received strong, albeit intermittent, support from the U.S. government during the 1990s. All operated outside Iraq or in areas of the country not under government control.
Following the Persian Gulf War, the KDP and the PUK, although often at odds with one another, operated in the Kurdish Autonomous Region with relative freedom and remained largely unhindered by the government. In the rest of Iraq, however, isolation and the UN embargo further consolidated power in the hands of the government. Following the overthrow of the Baʿathists in 2003, a number of small political parties arose, and the major expatriate parties resumed operations domestically. The Ṣadrist Movement, led by Muqtadā al-Ṣadr, a Shiʿi cleric strongly opposed to the presence of foreign troops in Iraq, emerged as another powerful Shiʿi party.
The Iraqi armed forces have often intervened in the country’s political life. There were numerous military coups between 1936 and 1968, and though the Baʿath regime depended heavily on military support for its survival, its mistrust of the military caused it to distance the armed forces from politics. There were frequent purges of the officer corps in order to root out those suspected of disloyalty, and security duties were divided between a complex network of military, paramilitary, and intelligence services, many of which reported directly to the president and all of which were commanded by individuals whose allegiance to him was without question.
In the 1970s Iraq began a systematic buildup of its armed forces, and by 1990 it had the most powerful army in the Arab world—and perhaps the fourth or fifth largest in the world. More than one million soldiers were under arms and had access to a plentiful supply of sophisticated weaponry. During the Persian Gulf War, the army suffered heavy losses in troops and matériel, and afterward it was trimmed to roughly one-third of its previous size. Remaining units were badly equipped, morale was low, and desertion was common. By the early 21st century, the regular army could still suppress internal revolts but was no match for the armies of neighbouring countries.
Iraq had a small but growing navy that was designed primarily for river and coastal defense. A once larger naval force was completely paralyzed by Iranian superiority at sea during the Iran-Iraq War and was virtually destroyed during the Persian Gulf War. New ships purchased abroad never arrived owing to the UN embargo, under which Iraq was not allowed to rebuild naval forces. The Iraqi air force was formerly large and well-equipped, but roughly half of its combat aircraft either were destroyed or were flown into hiding (many to Iran, which has since refused to return them) during the Persian Gulf War. Half of Iraq’s remaining aircraft were rendered inoperable owing to poor maintenance and a lack of spare components during the 1990s. However, Iraq devoted significant resources to air defense.
Under Saddam Hussein, major military programs centred on stockpiling chemical and biological weapons, developing a nuclear weapons program (or obtaining completed nuclear weapons), and creating a missile system capable of delivering chemical, biological, and nuclear warheads a distance of 600 to 800 miles (950 to 1,300 km). After the Persian Gulf War, the international community attempted to compel Iraq to stop developing such weapons, and reports that the country continued to stockpile those weapons and obtain associated matériel and technology served as the casus belli for the Iraq War. After the overthrow of the Baʿathists, members of paramilitary groups fled into hiding, and the CPA disbanded the armed forces. A new army of much smaller dimensions was recruited soon after.
Between 1958 and 1991 health care was free, welfare services were expanded, and considerable sums were invested in housing for the poor and for improvements to domestic water and electrical services. Almost all medical facilities were controlled by the government, and most physicians were (and still are) employed by the Ministry of Health. Shortages of medical personnel were felt only in rural areas. Cities and towns had good hospitals, and clinics and dispensaries served most rural areas. Still, Iraq had a high incidence of infectious diseases such as malaria and typhoid, caused by rural water supplies contaminated largely by periodic flooding. Substantial progress, however, was made in controlling malaria.
The Persian Gulf War greatly damaged components of the infrastructure, which had the immediate effect of higher rates of mortality and increased instances of malnutrition (especially among young children). However, by 1997 overall levels of health care had begun to increase as the oil-for-food program began to generate revenue for food and medicine. By the early 21st century, medical care, though no longer free, was still affordable for most citizens and was much more readily available than it had been since the start of the embargo. Shortages remained, especially of medicine, potable water, and trained medical staff. There is a severe shortage of physicians—as many as half of all physicians in Iraq left the country after 2003, and most have not returned.
Health care in most parts of the Kurdish Autonomous Region actually improved during the 1990s, and child mortality fell significantly. Malnutrition was much less common than in the remainder of Iraq, and by the 21st century potable water was available to four-fifths of the rural population (up from three-fifths in the mid-1990s). After 2003 the health care system relied heavily on donations from abroad and the efforts of international aid organizations.
The availability of adequate housing remained a problem in Iraq at the beginning of the 21st century. This was partly attributable to the major demographic shifts that had occurred in preceding decades, with large numbers of Shiʿis fleeing the south to overcrowded Baghdad and large groups of Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians being displaced by government policy in the north. Access to adequate water, electricity, and sanitation remained a problem both for new housing constructions and for existing residences. Many new immigrants to the city have been forced to reside in urban slums lacking all modern conveniences, and internally displaced persons in the north have had to live for times in tents, shantytowns, and other temporary residences.
Domestic architecture shows distinct regional variations, but the basic house types are similar to those of neighbouring countries. Mud brick is common throughout the south, while more stone is used in the north. Some of the larger villages are surrounded by mud-brick walls. The traditional reed houses of the marsh dwellers of the Al-ʿAmārah area, with their remarkable barrel-vaulted roofs, are unique to Iraq.
The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research have been responsible for the rapid expansion of education since the 1958 revolution. The number of qualified scientists, administrators, technicians, and skilled workers in Iraq traditionally has been among the highest in the Middle East. Education at all levels is funded by the state. Primary education (ages 6 to 12) is compulsory, and secondary education (ages 12 to 18) is widely available. At one time many Iraqi students went abroad, particularly to the United States and Europe, for university and graduate training, but this became rare following the Persian Gulf War. Iraqi girls have also been afforded good opportunities in education, and at times the rate of female university graduates has exceeded that of males.
Beginning in the early 1990s, however, enrollment, for both boys and girls, fell considerably at all levels as many were forced to leave school and enter the workforce. Moreover, lacking access to the latest texts and equipment, Iraqi schools slowly fell behind those of other countries in the region in terms of the quality of education they offered. The educational system had formerly been highly politicized, and, following the fall of the Baʿath Party, an entirely different approach was encouraged by the new government. The educational system still suffers from personnel and funding shortages.
The fundamental cultural milieu of Iraq is both Islamic and Arab and shares many of the customs and traditions of the Arab world as a whole. Within Iraq, however, there is rich cultural diversity. A variety of peoples were embraced by Iraq when it was carved out of the Ottoman Empire in 1920. These included the nomadic tribes of the arid south and west (related to the Bedouin of neighbouring states), the peasant farmers of central Iraq, the marsh dwellers of the south, the dryland cultivators of the northeast, and the mountain herders of Kurdistan. Adaptations to these contrasting environments have generated a mosaic of distinctive regional cultures manifested in folk customs, food, dress, and domestic architecture. Such regional differences are reinforced by the ethno-religious contrasts between Kurds and Arabs and by the fundamental division within Islam between the Shiʿah and Sunnis. These divisions are less marked than they were in the early 20th century but are still evident in the human geography of Iraq.
War always ravages daily life, and, following the start of the Iraq War, there were few aspects of daily social interaction that were unaffected by the shortages of water and electricity, damaged infrastructure, soaring unemployment, collapse of government facilities, or violence of postwar guerrilla action. In broader terms, however, over the course of the 20th century, one development was evident: rapid urban growth accelerated social change in Iraq as a higher proportion of the population was exposed to modern, largely Westernized, lifestyles. Traditional social relationships, in which the family, the extended family, and the tribe are the prime focus, have remained fundamentally important in rural areas but are under pressure in the towns. Alcoholic beverages and Western-style entertainment have become freely available, a circumstance much deplored by devout Muslims. Although the number of Muslims in Iraq embracing a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam has grown—as it has elsewhere in the Middle East—Islamic extremism has not presented a major social or political problem, given the nature of the former regime. The role of women has been changing, with a higher proportion participating in the labour force in spite of encouragement from the government to stay at home and raise large families.
Although Iraqis generally are a religious and conservative people, there are strong secular tendencies in the country. This is reflected in the dress, which, while conservative by Western standards (short or revealing clothes for men or women are considered inappropriate), is quite relaxed by the standards of the region, particularly compared with neighbouring Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Men will frequently wear Western-style suits or, in more casual surroundings, the long shirtlike thawb. The traditional chador and veil, the ḥijāb, is common among conservative women—especially those from rural areas—but Western attire is common.
Iraqi cuisine mirrors that of Syria and Lebanon, with strong influences from the culinary traditions of Turkey and Iran. As in other parts of the Middle East, chicken and lamb are favourite meats and are often marinated with garlic, lemon, and spices and grilled over charcoal. Flatbread is a staple that is served, with a variety of dips, cheeses, olives, and jams, at every meal. Fruits and vegetables are also staples, particularly the renowned Iraqi dates, which are plentiful, sweet, and delicious and, along with coffee, are served at the end of almost every meal.
Despite Iraq’s political hardships, literary and artistic pursuits flourish, especially in Baghdad, where Western artistic traditions—including ballet, theatre, and modern art—are juxtaposed with more traditional Middle Eastern forms of artistic expression. Poetry thrives in Iraq; 20th-century Iraqi poets, such as Muḥammad Mahdī al-Jawāhirī, Nāzik al-Malāʾika (one of the Arab world’s most prominent woman poets), Badr Shākir al-Sayyāb, and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bayatī, are known throughout the Arabic-speaking world. Iraqi painters and sculptors are among the best in the Middle East, and some of them, such as Ismāʿīl Fattāḥ Turk, Khālid al-Raḥḥāl, and Muḥammad Ghanī, have become world renowned. The Ministry of Culture and Information has endeavoured to preserve traditional arts and crafts such as leatherworking, copper working, and carpet making.
From 1969 the Baʿath Party made a concentrated effort to create a culture designed to establish a new national identity that reflected the territorial roots of the Iraqi people. Independent Iraqi artists and intellectuals had started a trend similar to this in the 1950s, and Iraq’s leader during the latter part of that decade and in the early 1960s, General ʿAbd al-Karīm Qāsim, encouraged it during his rule. The Baʿath regime, however, assumed full control of the program and took it to its zenith: playwrights, novelists, film producers, poets, and sculptors were encouraged to demonstrate the historical and cultural connection between the modern Iraqi people and the ancient peoples and civilizations of Mesopotamia. Archaeological museums were built in every governorate, and a European-style version of Babylon was built on its ancient ruins. A plethora of “territorial” cultural festivals were introduced, the most important of which was the Babylon International Festival, held in September in a reconstructed Hellenistic theatre on the ancient city site.
The regime also encouraged a return to tribal values and affinities and supported a return to Islamic tradition and law. Every aspect of this cultural rebirth, of course, was deeply penetrated by Saddam’s personality cult (not unlike the personalismo of Latin America). Images of the ruler, whether statues, photos, or portraits (his likeness adorned the national currency), were omnipresent, and his name was invoked at every public ceremony.
The Iraq Museum (founded 1923), with its collection of antiquities, and the National Library (1961) are located in Baghdad. The city also has some fine buildings from the golden age of ʿAbbāsid architecture in the 8th and 9th centuries and from the various Ottoman periods. In the 1970s the government made an effort to renovate some of Baghdad’s historical buildings and even whole streets, with partial success. A number of renowned archaeological sites are located in Iraq, and artifacts from these sites are displayed in excellent museums such as the aforementioned Iraq Museum and the Mosul Museum (1951). The Iraq Museum was extensively looted in the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Several thousand of the estimated 15,000 items taken from the museum’s collection have since been recovered.
In less-troubled times more than a million tourists would visit Iraq each year, many of them Shiʿis visiting much-revered shrines at Karbala and Najaf. Tourism was severely limited after the international embargo was initiated in 1991. After 1998 Iranian pilgrims were again allowed into the Shiʿi holy cities, and since 2003 virtually all limits have been removed from such travel.
As it is in most other Arab countries, football (soccer) is Iraq’s national passion. It became increasingly popular as a means of coping with the political and economic turmoil after 1980. A popular venue in Baghdad is Al-Shaʿb (“People’s”) Stadium, where throngs of Iraqis wait outside the gates even after the stadium has filled. Millions more watch via television throughout the country. In 2006 the national football team participated in the Asian Cup finals for the first time in more than two decades; in 2007 they won the title.
The Iraqi National Olympic Committee (INOC) was formed in 1948, and later that year the country made its Olympic debut in London. However, Iraq did not return to Olympic competition until the 1960 Summer Games, when it won its first medal (in weight lifting). Since missing the 1972 and 1976 Games, Iraqi athletes have consistently attended the Olympics, though they have not competed at the Winter Games.
Under the Baʿath Party, sports were highly politicized. ʿUdayy Hussein, one of Saddam’s sons, was both the chairman of the INOC and the president of the Iraqi Football Federation. Iraq was suspended from the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) after the OCA president was killed by Iraqi troops during the Persian Gulf War. The country did not attend the Pan-Arab Games in 1992 or in 1997, and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia at times boycotted games in which Iraq participated.
The media in Iraq are well developed, though they have traditionally been conservative and conformist in nature. There are a national television service and a number of regional television stations, including a Kurdish-language station. Under the Baʿath regime, newspapers such as Al-Thawrah (“The Revolution”), Al-ʿIrāq, and Al-Jumhūriyyah (“The Republic”) functioned as official mouthpieces. After the start of the Iraq War in 2003, an explosion of new publications of all types occurred, and diverse political views began to be aired.
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